
Chapter 10: Using Uncertain Knowledge

- Introduction
- Probability



D. Poole, A. Mackworth, and R. Goebel, Computational Intelligence: A Logical Approach Oxford University Press, January 1998

Introduction

- Agents don't have complete knowledge about the world.
- Agents need to make decisions based on their uncertainty.
- It isn't enough to assume what the world is like. (not omniscient but take decision in uncertain world!)
- Example: wearing a seat belt. (not accident or accident entails not seat belt!)
- An agent needs to reason about its uncertainty.
- When an agent makes an action under uncertainty it is gambling ⇒ probability.

Probability: Frequentists vs. Subjectivists

- Probability is an agent's measure of belief in some proposition — subjective probability = measure of belief of an agent given its knowledge! It is adopted
- Example: Your probability of a bird flying is your measure of belief in the flying ability of an individual based only on the knowledge that the individual is a bird.
 - Other agents may have different probabilities, as they may have had different experiences with birds or different knowledge about this particular bird.
 - An agent's belief in a bird's flying ability is affected by what the agent knows about that bird.

(uncertainty is epistemological rather than ontological!)

Numerical Measures of Belief

- Belief in proposition, f, can be measured in terms of a number between 0 and 1 — this is the probability of f.
 - The probability f is 0 means that f is believed to be definitely false.
 - The probability f is 1 means that f is believed to be definitely true.
- Using 0 and 1 is purely a convention.
- f has a probability between 0 and 1, doesn't mean f is true to some degree, but means you are ignorant of its truth value. Probability is a measure of your ignorance (in the subjective sense!).

Random Variables

- A random variable is a term in a language that can take one of a number of different values.
- The domain of a variable x, written dom(x), is the set of values x can take.
- A tuple of random variables $\langle x_1, ..., x_n \rangle$ is a complex random variable with domain $dom(x_1) * ... * dom(x_n)$.
- Assignment x = v means variable x has value v.
- A proposition is a Boolean formula made from assignments of values to variables.

Possible World Semantics

- A possible world specifies an assignment of one value to each random variable.
- w = x = v means variable x is assigned value v in world w (w f: f true in world w)
- Logical connectives have their standard meaning:

$$-\mathbf{w} \models \alpha \wedge \beta \text{ if } \mathbf{w} \models \alpha \text{ and } \mathbf{w} \models \beta$$

$$-\mathbf{w} \models \alpha \vee \beta \text{ if } \mathbf{w} \models \alpha \text{ or } \mathbf{w} \models \beta$$

$$-\mathbf{w} \models \neg \alpha \text{ if } \mathbf{w} \not\models \alpha$$

Semantics of Probability

- For a finite number of variables with finite domains:
 - Define a nonnegative measure $\mu(w)$ for each world w so that the measures of the possible worlds sum to 1.

The measure specifies how much you think the world *w* is like the real world.

- The probability of proposition f is defined by:

$$P(f) = \sum_{\omega \models f} \mu(\omega)$$

Axioms of Probability

- Four axioms define what follows from a set of probabilities:
 - Axiom 1 P(f) = P(g) if f ↔ g is a tautology. That
 is, logically equivalent formulae have the same
 probability.
 - Axiom $2.0 \le P(f)$ for any formula f.
 - Axiom 3 P(τ) = 1 if τ is a tautology.
 - Axiom 4 P(f V g) = P(f)+P(g) if \neg (f \land g) is a tautology.
- These axioms are sound and complete with respect to the semantics.

Conditioning

- Probabilistic conditioning specifies how to revise beliefs based on new information.
- You build a probabilistic model taking all background information into account. This gives the prior probability.
- All other information must be conditioned on.
- If evidence e is the all of the information obtained subsequently, the conditional probability P(h|e) of h given e is the posterior probability of h.

(medical diagnosis: e = symptoms and h = diseases, priors = p(diseases) do not see the patients)

P(e→f) ≠ P(f | e)
 birds are rare, non-flying birds are small proportion of birds:
 (P(¬flies | birds) ≠ P(birds → ¬flies)

Semantics of Conditional Probability

- Evidence e rules out possible worlds incompatible with e.
- Evidence e induces a new measure, e, over possible worlds

 $\mu_{e}(\omega) = \begin{cases} \frac{1}{P(e)} * \mu(\omega) & \text{if } \omega \models e \\ 0 & \text{if } \omega \not\models e \end{cases}$

 The conditional probability of formula h given evidence e is

$$P(h \mid e) = \sum_{\omega \models h} \mu_e(w) = \frac{P(h \land e)}{P(e)}$$

Properties of Conditional Probabilities

• Chain rule

$$\begin{split} & P(f_1 \wedge f_2 \wedge ... \wedge f_n) \\ & = P(f_1) * P(f_2 \mid f_1) * P(f_3 \mid f_1 \wedge f_2) * ... * P(f_n \mid f_1 \wedge ... \wedge f_{n-1}) \\ & = \prod_{i=1}^{n} P(f_i \mid f_1 \wedge ... \wedge f_{i-1}) \end{split}$$

Bayes' theorem

 The chain rule and commutativity of conjunction (h ∧ e is equivalent to e ∧ h) gives us:

$$P(h \land e) = P(h|e) * P(e)$$

= $P(e|h) * P(h)$.

 If P(e) ≠ 0, you can divide the right hand sides by P(e).

$$P(h \mid e) = \frac{P(e \mid h) * P(h)}{P(e)}$$

• This is Bayes' theorem.

Why is Bayes' theorem interesting?

• Often you have causal knowledge:

P(symptom | disease)

P(light is off | status of switches and switch positions)

P(alarm | fire)

P(image looks like a tree is in front of a car)

• and want to do evidential reasoning:

P(disease | symptom)

P(status of switches | light is off and switch positions)

P(fire | alarm)

P(a tree is in front of a car | image looks like 🌊)